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Abstract
Some of the most significant security issues arising in the context of ubiquitous mobile computing are
reviewed. Emerging technologies which may be able to help overcome these security problems are also
described; in particular we consider methods for secure ‘imprinting’ of mobile devices, techniques proposed
for establishing trust between devices with no prior relationship, and finally the relevance of trusted
computing technology to mobile security issues.
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1 Mobility and se-
curity
Over the last twenty years, mobile
telecommunications has grown
from being a small niche technol-
ogy to a massive industry. Mo-
bile telephones are now ubiqui-
tous, and the distinctions between
PCs, PDAs, mobile phones and
other mobile devices are becoming
increasingly blurred.
At the same time, personal
computing devices are becoming
increasingly ubiquitous, mobile,
and connected. Of particular sig-
nificance in this context is the
growing use of wireless communi-
cations (typically using variants of
the IEEE 802.11 protocol) to en-
able mobile devices to connect to
the Internet anywhere, anytime.
Against this background, the
security of information handled by
these devices, and of the mobile
devices themselves, becomes ever
more important, not least because
of our growing dependence on
these devices. It is rather fright-
ening to consider what might hap-
pen if these computing devices
suddenly lost the capability to
communicate wirelessly.
The main purpose of this pa-
per is to review some of the most
serious of the security issues aris-
ing in the context of ubiquitous
mobile computing. We also con-
sider some emerging technologies
which may be able to help over-
come these security problems. In
particular we consider methods
for secure ‘imprinting’ of mobile
devices, techniques proposed for
establishing trust between devices
with no prior relationship, and fi-
nally the relevance of trusted com-
puting technology to mobile secu-
rity issues.
2 Security issues
2.1 Security threats
Most of the security issues aris-
ing for networks of mobile devices
connected using wireless means
are the same as those arising
in more conventional wired net-
works; these concerns are docu-
mented in many standard secu-
rity textbooks (see, for example,
[4, 9]). That is, threats exist to
the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of information han-
dled by these devices; there is also
a need to protect the resources of
the devices (including data, pro-
cessing power, etc.) against unau-
thorised use.
It is, of course, true that some
of these security issues may be ex-
acerbated by the ease with which
wireless communications can be
intercepted. For example, it is
often claimed that mobile tele-
phone calls are more readily inter-
cepted than calls made using the
wired network; it is certainly true
that the ease with which wire-
less transmissions can be over-
heard has caused embarrassment
on more than one occasion in the
past. Whilst this latter problem is
no longer a serious threat in prac-
tice because of the widespread use
of over-the-air encryption of tele-
phone calls in GSM and third gen-
eration systems, the threat of in-
terference with wireless communi-
cations remains.
As a result, consideration of
the threats to wireless commu-
nications between mobile devices
leads to a familiar list of require-
ments for security services, most
importantly for:
• Entity authentication: de-
vices need a means to verify
the correctness of a claimed
identity for a remote device,
or, more generally, to verify
the claimed properties of a
device, e.g. membership of
an authorised group;
• Authorisation: measures
need to be established to
ensure that all access to re-
sources is authorised; this
typically requires prior au-
thentication of the request-
ing entity;
• Accountability : this is a ser-
vice closely related to autho-
risation, meaning that enti-
ties must be held account-
able for all resource-related
actions;
• Confidentiality : sensi-
tive data needs protecting
against being divulged to
unauthorised parties;
• Integrity : data must be pro-
tected against unauthorised
modification (including re-
ordering, deletion or replica-
tion).
Apart from these security re-
quirements, there may be re-
lated (but distinct) privacy re-
quirements. For example, a user
of mobile devices may not wish his
or her identity to be revealed to
wireless eavesdroppers. One rea-
son to distinguish between secu-
rity and privacy is that in some
cases security and privacy require-
ments may actually conflict; for
example, accountability often re-
quires identifying the author of
each action, which could conflict
with a desire by an end user to
remain anonymous.
Given that the security re-
quirements for these emerging
wireless mobile ubiquitous sys-
tems are much the same as those
for more familiar systems, then
what is the problem? That is,
why do we need to consider these
systems any further? Despite
the fact that the security require-
ments are the same, there are nev-
ertheless important differences in
this new setting, which do give
rise to major new problems. Most
significantly there are differences
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in the approach necessary to man-
age security, and in the necessary
underlying technologies.
The first major difference we
note is the breakdown of the
model traditionally used when
protecting closed corporate net-
works. Such networks are typi-
cally protected by a combination
of physical measures (building ac-
cess control, etc.) and the use
of firewalls to protect all traffic
sent between the inside and the
outside of the corporate network.
Unfortunately, the use of mobile
wireless devices by employees out-
side of the closed and protected
environment means that the no-
tions of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ no
longer apply. In this context we
should mention the work of the
Jericho Forum1; this international
collaboration of IT customer and
vendor organisations is dedicated
to the development of open stan-
dards to enable secure and bound-
aryless information flows across
organisations.
Secondly, we must contrast the
managed security environments of
corporations, where all devices are
owned and managed by the organ-
isation, with the world of multiple
interactions between personal de-
vices owned by many disparate in-
dividuals and organisations. Pro-
viding security in a managed en-
vironment, where we can rely on
the existence of a security infras-
tructure, is essentially a solved
problem (albeit that there may be
practical issues with deploying the
technology). In a managed setting
it is relatively straightforward, at
least in principle, to establish and
manage a security infrastructure,
e.g. the key management systems
established to support the provi-
sion of security services for the
GSM and 3rd generation networks
(see, for example, [7]).
However, managing security
for ad hoc collections of commu-
nicating devices is a problem for
which there are no simple solu-
tions. Devices which may never
have interacted before, and whose
owners have no contractual or
other relationship, may neverthe-
less need to interact in a secure
way. For example, it may be mu-
tually beneficial for a collection
of devices to collaborate to form
an ad hoc network, providing net-
work connectivity to all partici-
pants, where no such connectivity
would exist without cooperation.
Indeed, such an idea is the basis
of peer-to-peer (p2p) computing,
a subject of rapidly growing prac-
tical importance. Establishing a
basis for security in such an envi-
ronment is problematic indeed.
2.2 Security require-
ments
We have already noted the need
for the provision of authentica-
tion, authorisation, accountabil-
ity, confidentiality and integrity
services. We have also noted the
potential difficulty of providing
these in an unmanaged environ-
ment. We now briefly justify this
claim, by examining what is nec-
essary to provide some of the secu-
rity services we have already iden-
tified.
We first observe that our pri-
mary security requirements, i.e.
authentication, authorisation,
confidentiality, etc., together with
any privacy requirements, give
rise to what we refer to here as
secondary requirements. That
is, if we assume that our pri-
mary requirements will be met
using cryptographic techniques,
then use of these techniques im-
poses its own set of requirements.
In particular, use of cryptogra-
phy requires the existence of a
key management infrastructure,
which must either provide shared
secret keys for use with symmet-
ric cryptographic techniques, or
reliable copies of public keys with
use with asymmetric techniques.
Moreover, each pair of communi-
cating entities will typically need
to establish a security context,
including not only any shared
keys, but also information about
the level of trust and authorisa-
tion capabilities of the respective
parties.
Providing key management
and content establishment ser-
vices is therefore a fundamen-
tal requirement. However, ma-
jor issues exist in establishing ad
hoc security relationships between
mobile devices, in the absence of
a pre-existing security infrastruc-
ture. Initial trust setting is one
such major issue.
Moreover, not only is there
no obvious way to establish se-
curity contexts and perform key
management in many mobile net-
works, but most users of mobile
devices are also not likely to be
security aware, and hence cannot
be relied upon to perform com-
plex security management func-
tions. Therefore there is need
for a minimal security configura-
tion overhead on the user — (al-
most) automatic security initiali-
sation of devices is required.
In the remainder of this paper
we look in more detail at some of
these secondary security require-
ments, and consider possible ap-
proaches to addressing these prob-
lems in specific scenarios. How-
ever, we really only scratch the
surface of the problem, and this
area remains both a problematic
one for users, and also a focus of
much research activity.
1www.opengroup.org/jericho/
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3 Two fundamental
security issues
3.1 Security context es-
tablishment
We start by considering a basic
problem encountered when pro-
viding a security context for a pair
of mobile devices, when they are
owned or managed by the same
person. Of course, the problem
becomes more difficult when the
devices are owned by different in-
dividuals, and we consider this
problem later.
That is, to consider a simple
scenario, suppose a user has just
purchased a new mobile device,
and wishes to enable it to commu-
nicate securely with another de-
vice (via a wireless link). At the
same time, the user is not a se-
curity expert, and will not wish
to perform a lengthy and com-
plex initialisation procedure. This
is, of course, a problem faced by
every purchaser of a new Blue-
tooth enabled wireless device, e.g.
a wireless headset for an MP3
player.
This leads to the notion of ‘im-
printing’, as introduced by Sta-
jano and Anderson (see, for ex-
ample, [10]). In this context im-
printing simply refers to the pro-
cess where a security association
is established between a newly ini-
tialised device and some other de-
vice.
Bluetooth does incorporate a
PIN-based initialisation (imprint-
ing) procedure, with the goal of
setting up a shared secret key
between two devices. However,
the Bluetooth solution is, unfor-
tunately, seriously flawed, as has
been documented widely on the
web and in the research literature
(see, for example, section 9.5.2.1
of [7]). However, better solutions
have been devised, and some of
these are included in a recent in-
ternational standard [5].
We conclude this discussion
by giving a simple example of a
mechanism from ISO/IEC 9798-
6. This mechanism is designed for
the case where one device (A say)
has only a simple input interface
(e.g. a button used to signal suc-
cessful completion of the imprint-
ing process) but has a more so-
phisticated output interface (e.g.
a small screen), and the other de-
vice (B say) has a simple out-
put interface (e.g. a pair of lights)
but has a more sophisticated in-
put interface (e.g. a numeric key-
pad). Other mechanisms exist to
cover the cases where both de-
vices have a simple input inter-
face, and both devices have a sim-
ple output interface. The mech-
anism enables the two devices to
be certain that they both have
the same data string D, which we
assume has been sent across the
wireless interface (and could have
been modified or spoofed by a ma-
licious interceptor); whilstD is as-
sumed to be public, it can be used
with a mechanism such as Diffie-
Hellman key agreement to estab-
lish a shared secret key between
the two devices (as described in
ISO/IEC 9798-6).
Both devices output a signal
to acknowledge that they have re-
ceived data D and that they are
ready for the mechanism to com-
mence. On observing that both
devices are ready, the user enters
a signal into device A to tell it
to start. Device A generates a
random secret key K, where K
is suitable for use with a check-
value function shared by the two
devices. Using K, device A com-
putes a short check-value as a
function of D. The check-value
and the key K are then output
to the user by device A. The
user reads the check-value and K
from the output interface, and en-
ter them both into device B us-
ing its input interface. Device B
then uses the keyK to re-compute
the check-value as a function of
its stored version of D. If the
two check-values agree, then de-
vice B outputs a success signal to
the user via its simple output in-
terface; otherwise it shall give a
failure signal. Finally, the user en-
ters the result output by device B,
i.e. success or failure, into device
A via its simple input interface.
Both the key and the check sum
can be very short, e.g. 16–20 bits,
meaning that the user will not be
required to type in a large num-
ber of digits, and yet the mecha-
nism will be secure, as long as the
check-function is chosen carefully.
3.2 Trust and reputa-
tion
We next examine the problem
of security context establishment
in the case where devices belong
to different, potentially unrelated
users. On the face of it this seems
an almost insoluble problem. Yet
it is a problem which not only
must be solved, but in the real
world it is a problem we routinely
solve in practice in our social in-
teractions. One of the ways in
which we as human beings man-
age interactions with strangers is
via recommendations of friends
and official bodies. We use these
recommendations as input (along
with a host of visual and other
cues) into our assessment of the
degree of trust we can place in the
authenticity of a stranger.
This has led to a desire to try
and emulate these notions of trust
assessment and recommendation
in the electronic world. Electronic
analogues of trust already exist in
systems designed to enable groups
of users to assess each others’
trustworthiness, e.g. in reputation
systems used by online auction
sites. A huge amount of recent
research effort has thus been ex-
pended on designing methods for
quantifying trust, and on devel-
oping techniques for computing a
trust value. These techniques are
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often completely ad hoc, and with-
out any firm theoretical basis.
Interestingly, the basis for
much of this recent research on
quantifying trust was established
a dozen years ago by Beth et al.
[3]. This 1994 paper described a
means of computing a trust value
for an entity A based on trust val-
ues for A held by third parties
for whom trust values are already
known. The method proposed is
shown to possess some nice math-
ematical properties. Indeed, de-
spite the recent explosion of inter-
est in the area, the work in [3] is
still of significance.
Sadly, more recent work is of-
ten far less rigorous in its ap-
proach than that of Beth et al.
Often ad hoc methods for trust
computation are presented with
no attempt made at a mathe-
matical analysis. Most seriously,
what appears to be lacking is
any serious attempt to under-
stand how robust various mea-
sures of trust are against delib-
erate attempts by malicious enti-
ties to manipulate the trust com-
putations. In the study of cryp-
tography we regard the use of
cryptanalytic techniques as essen-
tial to try to judge the secu-
rity of a cryptographic primitive.
However, in contrast, general ap-
proaches to understanding the ro-
bustness of distributed trust com-
putation methods appear to be
lacking.
Even if we can come up with
completely satisfactory and ro-
bust means for computing mea-
sures for the trustworthiness of
entities, the problem remains of
reliably identifying other network
entities. That is, a means is
needed for securely associating a
name (or address) with a single
network entity. Without such a
means, a malicious entity could
assume the identity of a trusted
party.
One approach to resolve this
issue has been devised by Aura,
and is known as Cryptographi-
cally Generated Addresses [2]. In
essence, a network device is re-
quired to generate a key pair for
a signature scheme, and then to
generate its address as a function
of the public key using a one-
way hash-function (see, for exam-
ple, [6]). The entity can then
authenticate itself against the de-
rived address by using the pri-
vate signature key. As long as the
address space is sufficiently large
(and the cryptographic primitives
in use are secure), no third party
can find a key pair that matches
the address, and hence no third
party can claim ownership of the
address.
It should be clear that cryp-
tographically generated addresses
prevent one user from claiming to
own another user’s address. How-
ever, it does not prevent a user
from claiming many addresses si-
multaneously. Such an attack,
known as a Sybil attack, poses a
threat in some p2p scenarios.
4 Trusted comput-
ing
We now consider one technology
which appears to have the poten-
tial to solve a wide variety of the
problems associated with mobile
device interactions. This technol-
ogy is known as Trusted Comput-
ing.
It is possible that the ex-
istence of trusted functionality
on future mobile platforms will
help to solve many apparently
intractable security and privacy
problems in the mobile world.
Some degree of trusted function-
ality is already present in most
new mobile phones, to support se-
curity services required by net-
work operators, such as Interna-
tional Mobile Equipment Identi-
fier (IMEI) protection (to protect
against reuse of stolen phones),
and SIMlock (to prevent re-use of
subsidised phones with different
SIMs). However, whilst current
trusted functionality is manufac-
turer specific, there is a move to
use functionality conformant with
the industry standard Trusted
Computing Group (TCG) specifi-
cations2.
In general terms, Trusted
Computing refers to hardware-
based functionality in a comput-
ing platform that: (a) provides
a hardware (cryptographic) basis
of trust for system boot, integrity
verification of applications, etc.,
and (b) provides a means for
an external third party to ver-
ify the current state of a plat-
form. Considerable resources are
currently being devoted to both
hardware and software that sup-
ports trusted computing technol-
ogy. A number of vendors have
produced TPMs (Trusted Plat-
form Modules) conformant with
the TCG specifications. PCs in-
corporating TPMs are now widely
available. Meanwhile operating
system vendors and providers, in-
cluding Microsoft and the open
source community, are working on
operating systems exploiting this
functionality (note, in particular,
the OpenTC project3).
Of particular relevance here
are two main properties of a TCG
compliant platform (or trusted
platform).
• First, any such platform
possesses a secure environ-
ment containing a platform-
specific asymmetric key
pair, the means to com-
pute cryptographic func-
tions, and the means to
cryptographically prove to
2www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
3www.opentc.net
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a third party its right to
own one of a (potentially
large) number of externally
generated aliases. This in
itself can provide the means
to help establish security
contexts with other devices.
• Second, a trusted platform
is able to securely demon-
strate to any other party
precisely which software it is
running. In the context of a
p2p network, or a collabo-
rative ad hoc network, this
will be potentially hugely
valuable in proving that an
entity is cooperating as re-
quired (and is not behaving
in a ‘selfish’ fashion).
We conclude this discussion of
trusted computing by considering
ways in which TCG functional-
ity might help solve some of the
most pressing security and privacy
problems arising in mobile net-
works.
4.1 Stable identities
As we have already mentioned,
in scenarios lacking a security in-
frastructure, the Sybil problem
(where a single rogue entity claims
multiple addresses) is a major
challenge. Examples of where this
presents a problem include p2p
and ad hoc network settings.
More specifically, in an ad
hoc network, newly admitted de-
vices will typically need to be as-
signed a network address (or ad-
dresses). In the absence of a
fixed infrastructure this is prob-
lematic. Many currently proposed
solutions for address assignment
can easily be subverted to lead to
a denial of service, if Sybil attacks
can be launched.
Trusted computing may be
able to help, as discussed by Balfe
et al. in chapter 10 of [7]. We
now very briefly indicate how this
might be achieved, in a way which
nevertheless preserves user pri-
vacy.
Version 1.2 of the TCG speci-
fications include a protocol known
as Direct Anonymous Attestation
(DAA) (see, for example, chap-
ter 3 of [7]). This protocol en-
ables a trusted platform to prove
to a third party that it pro-
vides a reliable computing en-
vironment without revealing its
identity. Balfe et al. describe a
way of using the DAA protocol
which enables all the actions of a
particular platform to be linked,
while not revealing the true iden-
tity of that platform. This pro-
vides a stable identity for a plat-
form, both helping to prevent
Sybil attacks and still providing a
degree of privacy for an end user.
4.2 Identity manage-
ment
A range of different Single Sign-
On (SSO) technologies exist. In
an SSO system, a user authenti-
cates once to an Identity Service
Provider (ISP), and this ISP then
vouches for the identity of the
user to multiple Service Providers
(SPs). Clearly, the SP must trust
the ISP to tell the truth about
who has been authenticated and
how. Typically this means that
the ISP must be a networked en-
tity remote to the user.
This may be inconvenient in
a mobile setting, where the op-
portunity may not arise to set up
the necessary third party relation-
ships. As described by Pashalidis
in chapter 6 of [7], trusted com-
puting technology can he used to
enable the ISP to be implemented
on the user platform, in such a
way that the SP can verify its
trustworthiness.
4.3 Personal informa-
tion management
A growing number of possibilities
now exist for Internet SPs to of-
fer services tailored to end users.
However, this possibility also rep-
resents a privacy threat, since the
SP will typically need to know po-
tentially privacy-breaching infor-
mation about an end user in or-
der to provide the tailored ser-
vice. One key example (relevant
in a mobile context) is the use of
location information. How does
the subject of location informa-
tion prevent it being disseminated
and used in unauthorised ways?
It is possible that trusted com-
puting can help with this prob-
lem. The holder of location infor-
mation, and associated policy in-
formation (e.g. defining user pref-
erences), can use trusted com-
puting functionality to check the
platform requesting this informa-
tion before sending it. This check
could involve verifying the type of
recipient platform and the iden-
tity of the receiving application.
4.4 Limitations of
trusted computing
Before concluding, it is important
to note that trusted computing
technology has not been greeted
with universal enthusiasm; see,
for example, [1]. In particular,
suggestions have been made that
trusted computing is both a po-
tential threat to user privacy and
a threat to the ability of the owner
of a PC to use it as he or she sees
fit. However, some of the more
outspoken criticisms seem to have
arisen from misconceptions about
the likely applications of the tech-
nology.
Of course, until the technol-
ogy is in wide use, it is diffi-
cult to know whether trusted com-
puting will be a force for good
or ill. Whilst the hardware is
becoming increasingly ubiquitous,
at least on the desktop, the soft-
ware necessary to support appli-
cation of the hardware is taking
much longer to appear. The ap-
pearance of such software does
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not appear imminent, particu-
larly since the ambitions of Mi-
crosoft’s Vista now seem rather
more limited than was the case
a year or so ago. Indeed, the
open source community, as exem-
plified by the work of the Eu-
ropean Open Trusted Computing
project, seems likely to produce
software capable of taking full ad-
vantage of the technology long be-
fore Microsoft.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted
to convey some of the major se-
curity issues presented by the
growing reality of ubiquitous net-
works of mobile computing de-
vices. We have sketched some
of the possible approaches to ad-
dressing these security problems,
and have also highlighted areas
where further research is required.
The main finding of this paper
is that trusted computing tech-
nology could prove to be of ma-
jor benefit in solving some of the
most fundamental security prob-
lems that beset mobile and ubiq-
uitous computing. These prob-
lems include that of providing sta-
ble identities for devices, provid-
ing single sign-on services, and
controlling the dissemination of
personal information.
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